young children. The danger is particularly serious for children who work in hazardous industries. Working prevents children from benefiting fully from school and may thereby condemn them to perpetual poverty and low-wage employment. Moreover, many believe that child labor contributes to adult unemployment in developing countries. According to an ILO study, "Child labour is a cause of and may even contribute to adult unemployment and low wages" (Bequele and Boyden 1988: 90) . The trade lobby in industrial countries further argues that child labor gives developing countries an unfair cost advantage in international trade and that this constitutes a form of protection requiring corrective international action. For example, in a study of child labor in India's carpet industry, Levison and others (1996: abstract) find "a competitive cost advantage to hiring child labour with its magnitude relatively small for industrialised country sellers and consumers but relatively large for poor loom enterprise owners."
Notwithstanding almost universal agreement that child labor is undesirable, there is wide disagreement on how to tackle the problem. This stems partly from the lack of awareness of-let alone consensus on-the causes of child labor and the consequences of banning it through legislation. Although a few studies, for example, Knight (1980) and Horn (1995) , discuss mainly the qualitative features of child labor, most focus on its quantitative aspects, taking advantage of the increasing availability of good-quality micro-data. 1 Within the empirical literature on child labor there has been a shift from mere quantification to econometric analysis of its determinants. This has coincided with a widespread realization that simply banning child labor is unlikely to eradicate the problem and may even make it worse. As Knight (1980: 17) notes, "When child labor is prohibited by law, the law cannot protect child workers since they legally do not exist." The view that we need to understand the key determinants of child labor in order to formulate effective policies against it underlies the recent econometric work. Early studies centered mostly on Latin America, but recent studies have extended the focus to countries in Africa and Asia. 2 In this article I use data from Peru and Pakistan to examine the key determinants of child labor hours and the share of child and adult earnings in the household's total earnings. I focus on the similarities and dissimilarities between the Peruvian and Pakistani results. This study extends Ray (1998) , which analyzes child labor force participation, rather than child labor hours, and restricts attention to child employment, neglecting adult labor. Moreover, this article overcomes a significant limitation of Ray (1998) by estimating the equations for child labor hours separately for boys and for girls.
A key empirical result of this study is that the interaction between men's and children's labor markets is different from the interaction between women's and children's labor markets. The importance of this distinction is sharpened by the fact that the responsiveness of child labor hours to changes in adult wages is different in the Peruvian and Pakistani data sets. The case for distinguishing between how men's and women's labor interact with child labor can be traced to Grant and Hamermesh (1981) , who find that children and white women were substitutes, whereas children and white men were complements in production in the United States. 3 Another significant motivation of this article is to test the "luxury axiom" introduced by Basu and Van (1998: 416) : "A family will send the children to the labor market only if the family's income from non-child-labor sources drops very low." In view of the key role that this axiom plays in Basu and Van's analysis of child labor, an empirical evaluation of it has some policy significance. The test here throws light on the important question of whether poverty is the key determinant of child labor, as it is widely believed to be. Using data from more than one country is a good way to test whether this axiom is universal.
I chose the Peruvian and Pakistani data sets on the basis of two considerations. First, because the World Bank collected data in both these countries through its Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) program, the structure and coverage of these data sets are sufficiently similar to allow meaningful comparisons. Second, Peru and Pakistan make an interesting comparison because of their geographic distance from each other as well as their cultural, economic, and demographic diversity. For example, per capita gross national product (GNP) in Peru is more than twice that in Pakistan, and its population is only one-fifth the size. 4 The two countries also differ in family size, gender composition of the household, and the education and work experience of women and children. Crosscountry comparisons, especially those involving different cultures and continents, enable us to better understand the different types of policies needed in specific regional contexts.
I also examine the role of community infrastructure by including some community variables in the regressions. The results are of considerable practical significance since the community variables may be useful instruments for improving children's welfare.
I. PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE DATA
The data on child labor come from the 1994 Peru Living Standards Measurement Survey (PLSS) and the 1991 Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS).
3. See Diamond and Fayed (1998) for more recent evidence in favor of distinguishing between men's and women's labor. Note also that each of the case studies in the recent volume edited by Grootaert and Patrinos (1998) recognizes this distinction. I am grateful to the referee for drawing this volume to my attention.
4. See Lancaster, Ray, and Valenzuela (1999: These surveys were conducted jointly by the respective governments and the World Bank as part of the LSMS surveys carried out in a number of developing countries. 5 The LSMS surveys were designed to provide policymakers and researchers with the individual-, household-, and community-level data needed to analyze the impact of policy initiatives on living standards. The PLSS covers 3,623 households, and the PIHS covers 4,800 households. The Peruvian sample contains information on child labor and child schooling for 5,231 children ages 6-17 years, and the Pakistani data set includes 5,867 observations on children ages 10-17 years. Some of these observations could not be used, however, because of their poor quality.
To construct the data set on child wages, I combined information on income and work from a number of sources. The data on wages and labor hours pertain to children who are involved in full-time labor outside the home, for which they receive direct or indirect cash payments. I calculate the wages of children who work on family farms from the information on farm income and from the corresponding adult and child labor hours contained in the surveys. The regression estimates are robust to the changes in children's wage rates implied by alternative a priori apportionments of farm income between adults and children.
Since a central motivation of this study is to investigate the economic determinants of child labor, such as poverty and, especially, child wages, I do not consider in the substantive part of this article work that involves purely household chores nor forms of child labor that do not receive, explicitly or implicitly, cash remuneration. This limits the scope of the analysis somewhat, but makes it consistent with the ILO's definition of child laborers as "economically active" children (see Ashagrie 1993) .
The data set from Peru does not provide information on hours children spent on unpaid domestic work, and I therefore use all of the available information on child labor. In Pakistan the survey designers assumed that boys were not involved in domestic work, but household chores accounted, on average, for more than 90 percent of girls' total labor hours. I thus test the sensitivity of the regression results when unpaid, domestic hours are included as child labor for the case of Pakistani girls.
In both Peru and Pakistan rates of labor market participation for children increase with age (tables 1 and 2). These rates are similar for both countries. In the case of schooling, however, enrollment peaks at around 13 years in Peru. In Pakistan enrollment peaks earlier, at 11 years, and falls continuously to alarmingly low levels, especially for older girls. The gender picture is similar between the two countries with respect to child labor, whereas the enrollment rates of Peruvian children in all age groups are consistently higher than those of their Pakistani counterparts.
Pakistan's lower enrollment rates reflect the lack of good schools, compared with Peru. As Basu (1999) points out, the provision of good-quality schooling 5. See Grosh and Glewwe (1995) for an overview and general description of the LSMS data sets.
can play a big part in reducing child labor. Moreover, strict Islamic laws that keep women at home may explain the sharp fall in enrollment among older Pakistani girls, especially those in the age group 11-16 years. In that age group the employment and school enrollment rates of Pakistani boys move sharply in opposite directions, suggesting that, unlike Peruvian boys, Pakistani boys drop out of school completely to enter the labor market. This behavior is consistent with Weiner's (1996: 3007) observation on Indian child labor: "Most of the 90 million children not in school are working children." Note that some of Weiner's "working children" are not included here as child laborers because they do not receive wages. 6. Cartwright and Patrinos (1998) , for example, classify child workers who do not attend school and are not formally employed as "home care" workers.
It is possible to compare other key characteristics of the two data sets by looking at sample means (table 3) . A typical Pakistani household contains more children than a typical Peruvian household, although the rates of child poverty are similar in the two countries. With the poverty lines defined as 50 percent of the median nonchild household income per adult equivalent in the sample, the percentage of children living in poverty is similar in the two countries: 30.4 and 29.4 percent for boys and girls in Peru, and 27.1 and 25.6 percent for boys and girls in Pakistan. If we include children's earnings in household income, these figures fall to 29.3 and 29.0 percent for boys and girls in Peru and to 23.4 and 23.7 percent for boys and girls in Pakistan. These percentages point to children's small but perceptible contribution to pulling households out of poverty, that contribution being somewhat larger in Pakistan.
Relative to Peru, the proportion of children in Pakistan who have never attended school is alarmingly high. Further, there is a marked gender disparity in the educational experience of adults in Pakistan. On average, the most educated woman in a Pakistani household has only 39 percent of the schooling of the most educated man. This figure is 89 percent in Peru. The educational deprivation of women in Pakistan is further reflected by the fact that, unlike in Peru, women have received much less schooling than their children.
Relative to a man, a woman works fewer hours in outside, paid employment in Pakistan. The gap is much smaller in Peru. This feature, which reflects Islamic laws that constrain women's involvement with outside work, is also seen in the much higher ratio of children's labor hours to women's labor hours in Pakistan than in Peru.
Peruvian women contribute a much larger share of household earnings than do Pakistani women (table 4) . This is consistent with the sample characteristics presented in table 3, especially the fact that the difference in educational levels between Pakistani women and Pakistani men is much greater than the difference between Peruvian women and Peruvian men. Hence, Pakistani women have much less earning power than Pakistani men. Moreover, households in Pakistan are much more dependent on children's earnings than are households in Peru. Children in Pakistan lag only marginally behind women in their share of household earnings. This largely explains the result, presented and discussed later, that commercially paid hours of child labor are much more responsive to household poverty in Pakistan than in Peru.
II. ESTIMATION METHOD AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The empirical method is based on the two-step procedure, discussed in Maddala (1983) , for estimating labor supply equations after correcting for sample selectivity. The results were obtained using the LIMDEP program written by Greene (1995) . I ensure that the estimated child labor and child schooling equations are pure reduced-form equations with none of the variables on the right side likely to suffer from endogeneity.
Testing the Luxury Axiom
Since a key motivation of this exercise is to test Basu and Van's (1998) luxury axiom, I define the poverty status of a household with respect to a poverty line set at 50 percent of the median nonchild household income per adult equivalent of the sample. Peru and Pakistan disagree on the validity of the luxury axiom (table 5). The estimated coefficient of the poverty variable is weak and statisti- cally insignificant for both girls and boys in Peru. 7 The reverse is true for Pakistan. A Pakistani household that was previously not poor will increase the outside, paid employment of its children substantially, by approximately 500 child labor hours annually for each child, if it falls below the poverty line-exactly as predicted by the luxury axiom. This mixed response is consistent with our earlier observation that Pakistani children, especially boys, play a greater role in pulling households out of poverty than Peruvian children.
The Pakistani result appears to contradict Bhatty (1998 Bhatty ( : 1734 , who cites a variety of empirical studies on Indian child labor in support of the view that "income and related variables do not seem to have any direct significant effect on children's work input." However, as I report below, this contradiction is partly resolved by extending the definition of child labor to include domestic work. The evidence in favor of the luxury axiom weakens for Pakistani girls.
Testing the Significance of Wages and Other Explanatory Variables
It is possible to make other interesting comparisons between Peru and Pakistan. In both countries the coefficient of the age-squared variable is insignificant, suggesting a linear relationship between children's labor hours and age. In Pakistan increasing age has a greater impact on boys' labor supply than on girls', whereas in Peru there is no gender differential. However, this differential may be more apparent than real, since older girls in Pakistan are likely to spend time in unpaid domestic work, which we have not yet considered in the child labor estimations.
Ceteris paribus, in Peru and Pakistan both boys and girls living in urban areas work fewer hours than their rural counterparts, possibly reflecting the importance of farm employment as a destination of child labor in these primarily agricultural countries. However, in absolute terms, whereas the estimated coefficient of the regional dummy variable for girls' labor exceeds that for boys' labor in Peru, the reverse is indicated for Pakistan. 7. In response to a referee's suggestion that the statistical insignificance of the poverty coefficient in the case of Peru reflects multicolinearity between the poverty and the wage variables, I dropped all of the wage variables and still found the estimated poverty coefficient to be statistically insignificant.
Although both countries agree on the positive role that increasing the education of adults in the household plays in reducing both boys' and girls' labor, the size and significance of these effects are much stronger in Pakistan than in Peru. Moreover, most of the community variables have a significant impact on hours of child labor, with most of the estimated coefficients having the expected sign. For example, a deterioration in the sewage disposal system sharply increases girls' labor hours in Pakistan and boys' and girls' labor hours in Peru, but it reduces boys' labor hours in Pakistan. The significant impact of community variables on child labor is confirmed by the rejection of the joint hypothesis of no community infrastructure effects (table 5) .
Without exception, hours of child labor respond positively and significantly to child wages. Of particular interest are the estimated coefficients of the adult wage variables, which indicate the nature of the interaction between the child and adult labor markets. The estimated coefficients differ in sign and magnitude between girls and boys and between countries. In Peru increasing adult wages reduce boys' and girls' labor hours, suggesting that child and adult labor hours are substitutes in that country. In Pakistan rising women's wages sharply increase the labor hours of girls but have a negligible impact on the labor hours of boys. The statistically significant and negative coefficient on the quadratic of women's wages in the case of Pakistani girls suggests that this relationship is nonlinear and weakens in the higher age categories (see also Basu 1993) . Thus in Pakistan, without good schools and satisfactory day care arrangements, mothers who work have to put their children to work as well.
Comparing the estimated coefficients of the adult wage variables for Pakistan shows that the interaction between the children's labor market, especially that of girls, and the women's labor market is different from that between the children's and the men's labor markets. In response to a referee's suggestion, I reestimate the child labor equations for Pakistan using the woman's employment status as a dummy variable (1 if she works, 0 otherwise), in place of the woman's wage variable (given in table 5). 8 The results, which are presented in table 6, show that the estimated coefficient of the woman's employment status is positive and statistically significant for both boys and girls. In other words, children from households in which a woman is employed work longer hours than other children. This is consistent with the evidence presented in table 5 and confirms the close complementarity between girls' and women's labor markets in Pakistan. Moreover, the size and significance of the estimated coefficient of the woman's employment status is much higher for girls than for boys, suggesting a stronger relationship between women's and girls' labor markets.
Including Domestic Work
The results presented in table 5 relate to children in full-time, paid employment. To investigate the robustness of these results to a more relaxed treatment 8. In most cases the woman is the child's mother, but she may be the child's elder sister or aunt. of child labor, I now go beyond the ILO definition of child labor to include hours that children spend on domestic work. This information was, however, only available for Pakistani girls. Therefore I estimate labor equations for Pakistani girls with and without domestic duties (table 7) . Including domestic duties in the definition of child labor weakens the impact of poverty on a girl's labor hours, which fall from 473 to 60 a year. The statistical significance of the estimated coefficient of the poverty variable also disappears. In other words, Pakistani girls fall in line with Peruvian children in failing to support the luxury axiom. Clearly, when a household falls into poverty in Pakistan, girls, having to work more hours in outside, paid employment, are able to devote fewer hours to household chores. Consequently, the overall impact of poverty on their labor hours weakens sharply.
The absolute magnitude and significance of several other variables also weaken sharply. Rising woman's education continues to have a significant negative impact on hours of child labor. However, the impact of a man's education lessens and loses its statistical significance when domestic duties are included. Similarly, the magnitude and significance of the woman's wage coefficients weaken considerably, with the coefficient on squared wages losing its strong statistical significance. However, the different response of child labor hours in Pakistan to changes in a man's and woman's wages is robust to the alternative definitions of child labor. On a likelihood ratio test the community variables continue to have a significant impact on child labor, even in the presence of domestic duties.
Does the Luxury Axiom Hold for Schooling?
If we extend the luxury axiom to the context of schooling, a household would not send its children to school if it falls into poverty. A negative and statistically significant coefficient on the poverty variable would confirm this axiom. As in the case of child labor, the Peruvian evidence on child schooling, especially schooling of girls, contradicts the luxury axiom, and the Pakistani evidence confirms it (table 8) .
The results for Pakistan hold for both sexes, especially girls. This confirms the earlier observation, also noted by Weiner (1996) , Basu (1999) , and others, that South Asian children, especially girls from poor households, drop out of school to enter the labor market. The lack of good schools in Pakistan, along with the consequent discount that parents place on the value of their children's education, may explain this behavior. The gender differential in this respect is quite revealing, with Pakistani girls experiencing a much sharper reduction in their schooling than boys when their households fall into poverty.
Relative to Pakistani children, Peruvian children register much smaller and statistically insignificant changes in their schooling as they slip into poverty, with Peruvian girls even registering a small increase. This reflects partly the superior educational experience of Peruvian children in relation to children in Pakistan and partly the fact, as observed by Patrinos and Psacharopulos (1997) in their study of child labor in Peru, that Peruvian children combine employment with a. In the case of households with more than one working man or more than one working woman, I take the maximum wage earned as a measure of the man's and woman's wage, respectively.
Source: 1991 Pakistan Integrated Household Survey. schooling to a greater extent than in other countries. Patrinos and Psacharopulos (1997: 398) comment, "Working actually makes it possible for the children to go to school." Raising the education of adults has a positive effect on children's schooling in both countries. Parents who are more educated, especially those in Pakistan, are better able to see the value of their children's education and to resist the temptation to pull them out of school. Rising child wages increase the opportunity cost of education and significantly reduce child schooling in Pakistan. But the effect in Peru is statistically insignificant. The close complementarity between girls' and women's labor in Pakistan is consistent with the negative impact that rising women's wages have on child schooling. In other words, when women's wages rise, working mothers tend to pull daughters out of school and take them along to work. There is no such relationship in Peru. It is also interesting to observe that girls in Pakistan, although not boys, experience significantly more schooling in urban areas than in the rural countryside.
Estimating Earnings Share Equations
The regression estimates presented and discussed in table 5 relate to the individual labor supply behavior of children in the household. This is in line with the collective models of household behavior that have been proposed recently (see, for example, Alderman and others 1995) . Although such models are attractive from a policy viewpoint, especially since welfare analysis stems from and should explicitly relate to individual behavior, they have one significant limitation in the current context: decisions about a child's labor force participation and hours of work, leisure, and schooling are typically made by the adult, not by the child. The conventional treatment of the household in unitary models may therefore be relevant. Moreover, the share of household earnings contributed by men, women, and children and their responsiveness to changes in key household and community characteristics are of direct policy concern. The following approach maintains the assumption of joint welfare maximization underlying the unitary model. To provide empirical evidence on this issue, I estimate the following threeequation system of earnings shares: (from table 4 ) that, in Pakistan, on average, children contribute a nontrivial share (5.9 percent) of household earnings, not far below the share contributed by women (8.8 percent). The regression results indicate that the poverty status of a household has a highly significant impact on the earnings shares of men, women, and children (table 9) . When a Pakistani household falls into poverty, the earnings share of the woman and children increases significantly, at the expense of the man's share. This reflects the fact that poor households reside in regions with limited employment opportunities for men, coupled with the fact that men in poor households generally lack the skills needed for high-wage employment. The household thus becomes more dependent on the woman's and children's earnings to pull itself out of poverty. This further confirms the luxury axiom in the context of paid, full-time child labor.
The regression results also show that with increasing education of the adult members of the household, especially that of women, the household's dependence on child labor, as measured by the share of children's earnings, falls significantly. This is consistent with the negative impact of rising adult education on hours of child labor.
Rising wages of men and women have a significant positive impact on their own share in household earnings but lower that of one another. Notwithstanding the positive impact of increasing women's wages on girls' labor hours in Pakistan, the corresponding impact on children's earnings share is very small in both size and significance. Neither the region of residence nor the community variables have a significant impact on the earnings share of any household member. Finally, female-headed households, because they are more vulnerable to pov-erty, are much more dependent on the woman's and children's earnings than male-headed households.
III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This article proposes and applies a simple test of the hypothesis that there is a positive association between hours of child labor and household poverty. Such a a. In the case of households with more than one working man, more than one working woman, or more than one working child, I take the maximum wage earned as a measure of the man's, woman's, and child's wage, respectively.
Source: 1991 Pakistan Integrated Household Survey.
hypothesis, called the luxury axiom by Basu and Van (1998) , is based on the idea of parental altruism, namely, that adults send children to work only if income from their own labor falls to very low levels. I extend this idea to the context of children's education to imply that there is a negative association between years of children's schooling and household poverty. In other words, parents will reduce the schooling of their children if the household's adult earnings fall below the poverty line. I tested both of these hypotheses on household survey data from Peru and Pakistan. I chose these countries because their data sets were consistent with respect to various definitions and sources and because Peru and Pakistan differ substantially in some key socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. For example, at the sample mean the share of children's earnings in total household earnings is considerably higher in Pakistan then in Peru, but the reverse is true of women's earnings. Consequently, we observe from a comparison of poverty rates in the two countries, based on adult and aggregate earnings, that income from child labor pulls more households out of poverty in Pakistan than in Peru. These data sets thus provide a good basis for testing hypotheses on child labor and child schooling.
The hypothesized relationships between child labor and household poverty and between child schooling and household poverty are both strongly confirmed by the Pakistani data. When a Pakistani household falls into poverty, it increases each child's involvement in outside, paid employment by approximately 500 hours annually, just as the luxury axiom predicts. Such a household also reduces the schooling of its children, the reduction being much larger for Pakistani girls than boys. In contrast, the Peruvian data fail to detect any significant association between household poverty and child labor or between household poverty and child schooling.
Although any attempted explanation for these asymmetric results must be speculative pending further research, they do point to the lack of good schools in Pakistan, compared with Peru, and to the discount that Pakistani parents place on the value and relevance of their children's education. Moreover, Peruvian children combine employment and schooling, unlike Pakistani children. Our results on child labor in Pakistan are consistent with the views expressed by several commentators that the provision of good schools can do a lot to reduce child labor in South Asia and to break the strong link between poverty and hours of child labor. Although the relationships estimated here are pure reduced-form equations, the results point to the need to model and analyze child employment and schooling simultaneously in future work (see Rosenzweig and Evenson 1977 for an example of such an exercise).
The Peruvian and Pakistani estimates also differ in the responsiveness of hours of child labor to changes in adult wages. In Peru rising men's wages significantly reduce the labor hours of girls, while in Pakistan rising women's wages have a large and significantly positive impact on girls' labor hours. The close complementarity seen in Pakistan between girls' and women's labor markets does not appear to hold for others, confirming that the nature of these relationships varies with the sex of adults and children and among countries.
Both countries agree that increasing adult education, especially mothers' education, can positively influence child labor and schooling. The size and significance of the impact of adult education on both child labor and schooling are considerably higher in Pakistan than in Peru. This points to the importance of adult education in improving child welfare in Pakistan. Pakistani women are, on average, much less educated than their counterparts in Peru. This, coupled with the lack of good schools and satisfactory child care in Pakistan, explains the validity of the luxury axiom and the close complementarity between women's and girls' labor markets in Pakistan, unlike in Peru. A vicious intergenerational cycle of receiving little education thus emerges in Pakistan. A large and sustained investment in adult education and schooling infrastructure will be necessary to break this cycle.
Child labor, however undesirable, is still a reality in many developing countries. Until recently, the issue did not figure in the empirical analysis of household behavior. Traditional models of equivalence scales (see, for example, Ray 1983) have concentrated exclusively on the cost of a child rather than the cost to a child. Child labor is a good example of how misplaced such an emphasis can be.
The differences between child labor in Peru and Pakistan, especially with respect to the interaction of children's and adults' labor markets, merit closer examination. Moreover, it is also important to look at child labor from the demand side, using industry-level data. The existing literature favors the supply side. There is also a need to investigate the impact of child employment on health. The LSMS data sets ought to be expanded to include such information for children older than six years to enable such an investigation.
The immediate elimination of child labor is neither feasible nor desirable, especially in view of the nontrivial share of earnings that children's labor contributes to household income. In Pakistan, for example, 3 percent of households would continue to live in poverty if children did not work for wages. Simplistic solutions like banning child labor or implementing international trade sanctions will merely drive employed children from the formal to the informal sector, where they are less open to scrutiny and protection from the worst effects of employment.
